In this online appendix, we extend our model and results to incorporate (i) more than 2 products (part A) and (ii) preference of loyal customers (part B). All proofs are given in part C. Where necessary, we provide detailed expressions so that other researchers can follow each step of the extensions.
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Writing out for each customers 1 and 2, the demand for product A, which can take values 0, 1, or 2 is given as follows. DA(pA, pB, pC ) If p A is relatively low, both customers 1 and 2 would purchase product A, so D A = 2. As p A increases, the demand falls to 1. The customer that defected would either purchase product B or C, depending on that customer's predisposition levels Ω iB and Ω iC . Therefore, unlike the two-product case, the demand for product B is no longer 2-(demand for A) because of the existence of product C. Demand for product B and C are respectively, DB(pA, pB, pC ) DC (pA, pB, pC ) = 
As expected, all demand for product is decreasing in its price. We examine the resulting demand function using a simple example next.
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3 Example A-1. For simplicity, assume symmetric qualities q A = q B = q C . Moreover, assume that customer 1 is most favorably predisposed to A, then B, then C, i.e., Ω 1A < Ω 1B < Ω 1C , while customer 2 has the reverse predisposition, Ω 2C < Ω 2B < Ω 2A . For simplicity of illustration, assume that
Then, the demand expression for A simplifies to,
Similarly, the demand expression for C simplifies to,
We notice that as ambiguity ξ increases, the price range for which D A = 1 and D C = 1 becomes larger. In other words, the demand for product A becomes price insensitive (or sticky) at D A = 1, and demand for product C becomes price insensitive (or sticky) at D C = 1. This is because customer 1 will stick to purchasing product A (his/her most favorably predisposed product) while customer 2 will stick to purchasing product C (his/her most favorably predisposed product). What happens to product B? The demand expression for B is, We have three cases depending on the values of p A and p C .
Authors' names blinded for peer review 4 Article submitted to Marketing Science; manuscript no. MKSC-15-0271.R2
Without loss of generality, let's take the first case where p A < p C . As ambiguity ξ increases, the region where D B = 1 increases only if p A + ξ < p C − ξ, or when p C >> p A . In other words, when price of product C is exorbitantly high, with more ambiguity, customer 2 who is most favorably predisposed to C will settle for The asymmetric effect of ξ on the three demand curves occurred because while the products were symmetric in their qualities, q A = q B = q C , they were asymmetric on the consumer predispositions. That is, only 2 products (A and C) had most favorably predisposed customers, while product B had both neutrally predisposed customers.
We next show that having three equal quality products and three customers with predispositions equally diversified among three products results in three symmetric demand curves.
A.2. 3 products and 3 customers
There are now 3 customers, 1, 2, and 3. Extending the demand functions from the previous section to take values 0,1,2, and 3, we have:
Example A-2. For simplicity, we take the products to be symmetric in quality, i.e., q A = q B = q C .
Notice that each customer i ∈ {1, 2, 3} has three predisposition quantities Ω iA , Ω iB , and Ω iC , whose 3 pair-wise differences determines their purchase choice. We assume the following inequality:
In other words, customer 1 is most favorably predisposed to A, followed by B, then C. Customer 2 is most favorably predisposed to B, followed by C, then A. Customer 3 is most favorably predisposed to C, followed by A, then B. This is symmetric in the sense that each product has exactly 1 most favorably predisposed, and also exactly 1 second-and exactly 1 least favorably predisposed customers. Moreover, the magnitude of the difference in predispositions are also identical,
Plugging in these values, the demand expressions above simplify to 
Further simplifications result in the following symmetric demand expressions:
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From these expressions, we see that if the prices were set so that p A = p B = p C , each product will get 1 customer who is most favorably predisposed, and that customer is less likely to switch to another product when ambiguity ξ increases. This is illustrated in Figure A In the example above, the three customers' predispositions from each firm's viewpoint, are distributed as follows (maintaining consistent order of comparison, i.e., A compares with B then C; B compares with C then A; C compares with A then B):
customer 1 customer 2 customer 3
In other words, the 3 customers' relative preferences are distributed in an identical manner for all three firm's viewpoint. In other words, the distribution are identical. We next extend this notion of symmetry for continuous mass of consumer population. 9
A.3. Extension to continuous mass of consumer population
Recall that customer i will purchase product A (and not B or C) if and only if
Equivalently, if and only if
Let us normalize the demand to 1, and have h A (Ω AB , Ω AC ) denote the probability mass of consumers from firm A's point of view. Similarly, h B (Ω BC , Ω BA ) and h C (Ω CA , Ω CB ) denote the probability mass of consumers from firm B and C's perspective respectively.
All consumers i's that satisfy both inequalities above will purchase product A. Thus, the demand for product A is
This is visualized in Figure A- 
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Figure 1
Visual illustration of demand curve DA(pA|pB, pC ). Note that as pA increases, the region shrinks both horizontally and vertically. Thus, we will see later that when we take derivative with respect to pA it will involve the sum of two partial derivatives.
Similarly, we have
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We next present the equilibrium result for the special case of symmetric competition, where all firms have equal qualities and no firm has a predisposition advantage (i.e., they are similarly situated products).
Corollary A.1 (Symmetric Competition). Suppose that q A = q B = q C , and h A (Ω AB , Ω AC ), h B (Ω BC , Ω BA ), and h C (Ω CA , Ω CB ) are identically distributed. Then
The expression is easily generalized to n firms, where for each firm j, p * j = ξ nh(0) , D * j = 1 n .
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Appendix B: Presence of Loyal Customers: Asymmetric Case
To make intuition precise for the asymmetric case, we suppose that predispositions are uniformly distributed
in Ω ∈ [−x + K, x + K]. Using the uniform distribution for H, we have
Let, p 0 * A ≡ ∆Q 3 + x − K 3 ξ and p 0 * B ≡ − ∆Q 3 + x + K 3 ξ denote the equilibrium prices without loyal customers (i.e., when l A = l B = 0) as in Corollary 2. Provided that the loyal customers have higher thresholds than the equilibrium market price, we have the following equilibrium prices with loyal customers.
Proposition B.1. Suppose that h(Ω) = 1/2x, with Ω ∈ [−x + K, x + K] for some K and some x > 0, and that the degree of ambiguity ξ > 0.
We notice that having loyal customers has the effect of scaling the value of x. From the expressions, we can also see that the equilibrium prices (p * A , p * B ) increases from (p 0 * A , p 0 * B ) to (p A ,p B ) as l A , l B , or both increase. Moreover, for any level of loyal customers (l A , l B ), (p * A , p * B ) is nondecreasing in ambiguity ξ.
Taking the first-order conditions, we have
This condition when p * A = p l * A occurs when,
Similarly, the first order conditions of π 0 A (p A , p B ) ≡ p A D A (p A , p B ) for the expression when p A >p A , corresponding to the case when all the loyal customers have low willingness-to-pay and the firm can maximize assuming that it will not retain the loyal customers. This is,
The condition when p * A = p 0 * A occurs whenp A is small, specifically when π 0
We have that,
Applying the quadratic equation, we havē
− 4(p 0 * A ) 2 = p l * A − (p l * A ) 2 − (p 0 * A ) 2
We want to find p B that makes this equality hold. So, p A = p l * A − (p l * A ) 2 − (p 0 * A ) 2 ⇔ (p l * A ) 2 − (p 0 * A ) 2 = p l * A −p A ⇔ (p l * A ) 2 − (p 0 * A ) 2 = (p l * A −p A ) 2 ⇔ −(p 0 * A ) 2 = −2p l * ApA +p 2 A ⇔ (p 0 * A ) 2 − 2p l * ApA +p 2
Applying the quadratic equation with respect to p 0 * A , we have
Since p 0 * A = ∆Q 2 + (x−K)ξ 2 + p B 2 , solving for p B we have
Thus, when p B > 2p A − ∆Q − (x − K)ξ + 2 2xξl A 1−l A −l B p A , firm A is better off setting price as if loyal segment does not exist.
Finally there are cases where it is beneficial for firm to charge a price p A =p A so as to retain the loyal customers. In this case, the firm is better off maximizing the benefit from all the loyal customers rather than optimizing the profit without the loyal segment of consumers. This occurs when p B is in between these two thresholds. Thus, we have the best response expression for p * A (p B ). The best response expression for p * B (p A ) can be found in a similar manner.
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